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DEVELOPING A DOMESTIC
FRAMEWORK FOR INTERNATIONAL
REGULATORY COOPERATION
REEVE T. BULL*
I
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the emergence of the World Trade Organization and the
negotiation of a complex array of bilateral and multilateral free trade
agreements have led to a substantial reduction in tariffs and other traditional
1
barriers to free trade. Though residual tariffs pose an ongoing impediment to
international commerce, traditional trade barriers have become exceedingly
weak by historical standards and have further eroded in the last several
decades, particularly as developed economies have sought the increasing
2
integration of their trade channels. Thus, free trade advocates have largely
shifted their focus to nontraditional trade barriers. Perhaps the single largest
obstacle to enhanced international trade is the persistence of disparities
3
between individual nation-states’ regulations. Unnecessary regulatory
disparities pose a far more insidious threat to international trade than do tariffs,
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1. For instance, average tariffs between the United States and the European Union (EU)
currently stand at roughly three percent. European Commission, Countries and Regions: United States,
(Oct.
31,
2014),
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-andEUROPEAN COMMISSION
regions/countries/united-states. U.S. tariffs are, on average, well below ten percent, a precipitous
decline from the roughly sixty-percent rates that prevailed at earlier periods in U.S. history (for
example, in the aftermath of the Smoot–Hawley Tariff). Paul Krugman, US Tariff History, N.Y. TIMES,
THE OPINION PAGES (Nov. 7, 2009, 1:33 PM), http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/11/07/us-tariffhistory.
2. See Michael T. McCarthy, International Regulatory Cooperation, 20 Years Later: Updating
ACUS Recommendation 91-1, 5–7 (Oct. 19, 2011) (draft), http://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/COR-IRC-report-10-19-11.pdf (citing the rise of the World Trade Organization, the
negotiation of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, and efforts to align international
standards as major factors in the increased integration of international regulatory frameworks).
3. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV. [OECD], INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY
COOPERATION: ADDRESSING GLOBAL CHALLENGES 15 (2013).
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for nation-states legitimately implement regulations designed to protect their
citizens with varying levels of protection depending on the risk-tolerance levels
4
of the nations’ respective citizenries. Though many regulatory differences
represent a studied effort to tailor protections to public risk tolerances, a
5
number of regulations differ simply for historical, nonsubstantive reasons, and
still other disparities emerge as a result of rent-seeking behavior by domestic
6
industries pursuing an unfair advantage vis-à-vis foreign competitors.
Unfortunately, distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate regulatory differences
is a difficult and politically fraught process, for very few regulations lack any
7
nominal welfare-enhancing justification.
In the last several years, U.S. regulators have made initial forays into the
enormously complex task of identifying and correcting unnecessary regulatory
disparities. In December 2011, the Administrative Conference of the United
States adopted Recommendation 2011-6, which urged U.S. agencies to seek
opportunities for regulatory cooperation with foreign authorities when doing so
would either advance the agencies’ regulatory missions or remove unnecessary
8
barriers to trade without undermining those missions. Partly in response to the
Administrative Conference’s recommendation, President Barack Obama issued
Executive Order 13,609 in May 2012. EO 13,609 directs agencies subject to
presidential regulatory review to summarize their international regulatory
cooperation activities in their Regulatory Plans and to minimize unnecessary
differences between U.S. regulatory requirements and those of key trading
partners both in promulgating future rules and in conducting retrospective
9
review of existing rules. EO 13,609 thus places a high priority upon a crossborder issue that many agencies had largely neglected insofar as it was viewed
10
as outside the ambit of their overall regulatory missions.
Nevertheless, without additional reforms designed to promote international

4. Reeve T. Bull, Far from Eroding Regulatory Protections, TTIP’s Cooperation Regime Could
Bolster Sound Regulation, BLOOMBERG BNA DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES, July 23, 2014, at 3,
https://www.acus.gov/publication/far-eroding-regulatory-protections-ttip’s-cooperative-regime-couldbolster-sound.
5. McCarthy, supra note 2, at 8.
6. K. William Watson & Sallie James, Regulatory Protectionism: A Hidden Threat to Free Trade,
723 CATO INST. POL’Y ANALYSIS 1, 2 (2013).
7. See id. at 5 (“Even if a particular regulation serves a protectionist end, its most vocal and
visible supporters may be activists or organizations pursuing an independent agenda that has no
particular sympathy for domestic industry.”).
8. Administrative Conference of the United States, Recommendation 2011-6, International
Regulatory Cooperation, 77 Fed. Reg. 2257, 2259 (Jan. 17, 2012). Recommendation 2011-6 built upon a
predecessor, Administrative Conference Recommendation 91-1, which similarly urged U.S. agencies to
collaborate with overseas entities as appropriate. Administrative Conference of the United States,
Recommendation 91-1, Federal Agency Cooperation with Foreign Government Regulators, 56 Fed.
Reg. 33,842 (July 24, 1991).
9. Exec. Order No. 13,609, § 3, 77 Fed. Reg. 26,413, 26,414 (May 4, 2012).
10. See McCarthy, supra note 2, at 19–21 (noting how numerous agencies are uncertain of their
legal authority to engage in international regulatory cooperation and only do so if they see it as directly
advancing their regulatory mission).
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regulatory cooperation on the part of U.S. agencies, EO 13,609 is unlikely to
effect a significant change in the regulatory landscape. By proposing a
framework for scrutinizing existing U.S. regulations and eliminating
unnecessary international disparities, this article builds upon the impetus of EO
13,609 and other high-level efforts at promoting global regulatory convergence.
Specifically, this article proposes empowering members of the public—
including individual citizens, businesses, and public interest organizations—to
request that an agency justify existing regulatory disparities. The responding
agency may then pursue one of three potential courses. First, if it finds that the
regulatory disparity serves no legitimate purpose, it may choose to harmonize a
regulation with that of a trading partner, recognize compliance with the
overseas regulation as equivalent to compliance with the corresponding U.S.
regulation, or otherwise seek greater compatibility between the differing
regulations. If, on the other hand, the agency believes that the disparity is
justifiable, then it may pursue one or both of two courses of action. If the
agency maintains that the disparity can be justified solely on technical
grounds—for example, U.S. regulators relied upon particular studies that are
more accurate than those used by foreign regulators—then it may produce the
relevant studies, and the requesting party can then determine whether to
challenge the regulation. If the disparity is based upon a policy determination
by the agency—for example, U.S. regulators determined that existing studies,
though incomplete, merited regulatory action to mitigate a particular risk—then
the requesting party can seek to demonstrate that the agency has over- or
under-regulated in light of the true public risk tolerance. The burden would
then shift to the agency to justify a regulation that does not reflect the actual
public risk tolerance.
This article also addresses several potential objections to the
aforementioned framework. First, it examines the risk that the proposed
mechanism would create additional outlets for industry to capture regulators or
complicate the regulatory process by forcing agencies to justify regulatory
disparities. The article concludes that, though this risk is not negligible, it is
likely relatively inconsequential insofar as public interest organizations will
have an equal opportunity to advocate for stronger regulations and agencies
will serve as a bulwark in favor of welfare-enhancing regulations. Second, the
article considers the prospect that unilaterally adopting such a system may put
U.S. firms at a competitive disadvantage if trading partners do not enact similar
reforms. Though the U.S. economy would arguably benefit even from unilateral
regulatory convergence efforts, which would provide benefits for consumers
11
and many exporters while nevertheless inflicting some harm on other firms,
U.S. trade representatives should also advocate similar reforms for trading
partners to achieve the greatest possible benefit for U.S. firms. Finally, the
article considers the potential costs these reforms would create for U.S.

11. HENRY HAZLITT, ECONOMICS IN ONE LESSON 80–84 (2010).
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agencies, a problem that could be greatly mitigated by requiring challenging
entities to bear some or all of the associated expenses.
Importantly, the proposed framework for achieving enhanced regulatory
compatibility is not intended to create a “race to the bottom” or to induce
agencies to abandon their public welfare–enhancing mandates in favor of
promoting maximum free trade. Indeed, public interest organizations would be
equally capable of exploiting the contemplated procedures to attempt to
strengthen relatively weak U.S. regulations, for example, an environmental
group seeking to achieve greenhouse gas emission limits comparable to those
prevailing in the European Union (EU). Furthermore, the agency’s regulatory
mandate would always remain the preeminent consideration; the process would
merely identify regulatory disparities that create unnecessary trade barriers
without any countervailing public welfare benefits, are based on inaccurate or
outdated technical findings, or reflect a level of risk tolerance that differs from
the level favored by the general public. In many instances, the analysis would
demonstrate that citizenries in different nation-states prefer disparate levels of
regulatory protection. Notably, the proposed system would not infringe upon
the unassailable prerogative of sovereign nations to define the extent of
regulatory protection that satisfies their citizens. Nevertheless, one can
confidently assert that historical accidents, delays in amending regulations to
reflect scientific advances, and failures of regulators to accurately gauge public
risk tolerance account for many of the discrepancies endemic to current
national regulatory regimes. This proposed framework provides a neutral,
effective mechanism both for achieving enhanced regulatory compatibility and
for ensuring that regulatory entities serve the best interests of the regulated
public.
II
TOWARD A DOMESTIC FRAMEWORK FOR INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY
COOPERATION
When first formulated in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
the doctrines of public administration envisioned a class of apolitical regulatory
experts that would impartially assess the major risks confronting a given society
using the scientific method and then erect regulatory protections designed to
12
achieve the greatest public good with the smallest possible outlay of resources.
Though the rise of the administrative state across the globe has indubitably
delivered significant benefits to citizens of the modern industrialized world, the
vision of a cadre of technocrats devoting resources to the most vexing
regulatory problems has proven overly simplistic. In reality, regulatory
intervention has followed what can best be characterized as a “crisis and
response” model: regulators will largely overlook a potential risk until it has
12. See Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, 2 POL. SCI. Q. 197, 197 (1887) (“The
object of administrative study is to rescue executive methods from the confusion and costliness of
empirical experiment and set them upon foundations laid deep in stable principle.”).
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manifested itself, at which point they will adopt elaborate regulations designed
13
to foreclose any repeat occurrence (very often overregulating in the process).
Because regulators in different nations will not face the same panoply of
salient risks at any given point in time, regulations will diverge in the initial
instance absent a robust system of international coordination that has not
heretofore existed, and these disparities will crystallize over time as a result of
regulatory inertia. Thus, the overall appetite for relatively strong or weak
regulation within a given nation will depend upon the preexisting regulatory
landscape. For instance, a series of regulatory failures in the public health
context in the EU in recent decades, which may largely have resulted from
relatively weak regulatory protection, helps explain the ratcheting up of
European regulatory protection vis-à-vis that prevailing in the United States
14
from the 1980s onward. In addition, within any given sector, the level of
protection adopted may vary in response to random fluctuations in the
regulatory failures that recently arose in any one nation. For instance, though
the United States and Western European nations have adopted very stringent
regulations to protect against the hazards posed by nuclear power, the
occurrence of the Three Mile Island disaster in the United States and the
absence of any equivalent meltdown in the EU may explain the comparatively
greater risk tolerance of France and other EU nations that rely heavily on
15
nuclear power generation.
In short, the existing regime suffers both from a lack of coordination among
trading partners and from the failure of regulators to analyze risk systematically
and allocate regulatory resources accordingly. One possible solution to this
dilemma would entail the creation of a supernational regulatory entity, which
would marshal the most up-to-date research to analyze existing risks and then

13. See, e.g., Reeve T. Bull, Building a Framework for Governance: Retrospective Review and
Rulemaking Petitions, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 101, 107–13 (2015) (“As a general matter, societies have not
objectively assessed the probability of known risks and then determined how best to allocate existing
resources to protect against the most significant risks. Instead, governments tend to react to highly
visible, well publicized calamities that capture the public interest, regulating so as to minimize the
likelihood of a repeat occurrence.”); Karl S. Okamoto, After the Bailout: Regulating Systemic Moral
Hazard, 57 UCLA L. REV. 183, 186 (2009) (“As the U.S. government responds to the immediate crisis,
attention has turned to the question of a broader regulatory response . . . . Yet, at the same time, we run
the risk of doing even more harm by overreacting.”); Robert V. Percival, Regulatory Evolution and the
Future of Environmental Policy, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 159, 173 (1997) (“The myopic tendency of
regulatory policy to overlook the effects of long-term, chronic exposures in favor of responding to the
headline-grabbing crisis of the moment is well documented.”).
14. See David Vogel, The Politics of Risk Regulation in Europe and the United States, in 3 THE
YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 2–3, 24–34 (H. Somsen et al. eds., 2003)
(cataloguing various regulatory failures over the course of the 1980s and 1990s in Europe). By the same
token, the existence of a legacy of relatively strong regulatory protections in the United States may
have resulted in fewer major failures, potentially contributing to a general apathy concerning systemic
risks and a willingness to water down existing protections.
15. See Jonathan B. Wiener, Whose Precaution After All? A Comment on the Comparison and
Evolution of Risk Regulatory Systems, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 207, 227 (2003) (indicating that
European nations generally take a more “precautionary” approach than does the United States in the
nuclear power arena).
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either mandate or recommend that individual nations adopt appropriate
16
regulations. As a normative matter, however, such a solution would be largely
irreconcilable with the principles of national sovereignty that govern modern
17
international law. Furthermore, a centralizing approach would likely create
18
significant inefficiencies. As F.A. Hayek has demonstrated, a system that
aggregates the decentralized expertise existing in a large group of individuals is
far more likely to produce an efficient outcome than a highly concentrated
19
system relying upon a small group of experts. Thus, a more attractive solution
might entail encouraging enhanced information sharing among regulators in
sovereign states and erecting procedures within those states to promote the
minimization of unnecessary regulatory divergences (while still preserving the
autonomy to enact disparate regulations if deemed appropriate).
EO 13,609 adopts, in theory, precisely this approach: it urges U.S. agencies
to identify regulations that are likely to have significant international impacts
and to consider the regulatory frameworks adopted by foreign governments in
20
appropriate circumstances. Though this is an important advance and
represents the highest level of executive branch commitment to international
regulatory cooperation to date in the United States, it is unlikely to work a
significant sea change in the regulatory landscape, for three reasons.
First, the EO tasks a regulatory working group with identifying
21
opportunities for international cooperation and requires that agencies describe
anticipated international regulatory cooperation activities in their Regulatory
22
Plans and in the Unified Agenda. It is not entirely clear, however, whether the
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) or any other body has
the authority to direct agencies to pursue any specific actions. Most agencies
have historically failed to place a strong emphasis on coordination with
23
international counterparts, and the EO may not significantly alter this state of
affairs.
Second, the EO provides that “the Administrator of OIRA may solicit
input, from time to time, from representatives of business, nongovernmental
16. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK
REGULATION 55–81 (1993) (proposing a centralized superagency that would be tasked with
coordinating risk-management decisions across all individual agencies in the United States).
17. See U.N. Charter, art. 2, para. 1 (“The organization is based on the principle of the sovereign
equality of all its Members.”).
18. See Jonathan B. Wiener & Alberto Alemanno, The Future of International Regulatory
Cooperation: TTIP as a Learning Process toward a Global Policy Laboratory, 78 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., no. 4, 2015, at 132 (warning against an excessive emphasis on harmonization, which might stifle
regulatory experimentation).
19. F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 94–95 (Bruce Caldwell ed., 2007).
20. Exec. Order No. 13,609, § 3, 77 Fed. Reg. 26,413, 26,414 (May 4, 2012).
21. Id. § 2 at 26,413–14.
22. Id. §§ 3(a)–(b) at 26,414.
23. See McCarthy, supra note 2, at 19–21 (highlighting reasons why some U.S. agencies have
placed a relatively low priority on international regulatory cooperation, including uncertainty regarding
legal authorization to engage in such activities, relatively minimal political emphasis on the issue, and
potential legal barriers on the sharing of information across borders).
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organizations, and the public” to inform the discussions of the regulatory
24
working group. Yet the system it creates relies chiefly on agencies or OIRA to
identify opportunities for international cooperation rather than erecting any
broader mechanism to leverage the expertise of the private sector or the input
of the general public.
Third and finally, the EO does not explicitly distinguish between technical
regulatory issues (for example, what level of benzene exposure creates a
statistically significant increase in cancer rates) and policy-based regulatory
issues (for example, what level of benzene exposure should be deemed “safe”).
The contours of successful regulatory cooperation heavily depend on the nature
of the problem being confronted, and past efforts at cooperation have not
carefully delineated these two types of problems.
The remainder of this article constructs a framework for supplementing the
regime created by EO 13,609. It aims to provide a rubric for characterizing
regulatory problems so as to facilitate international cooperation, identify
potential reforms that exploit the expertise residing in the private sector and the
general public, and create a framework for requiring agencies to justify existing
regulatory disparities in order to promote regulatory accountability. The
reforms proposed would not result in regulatory convergence in all instances
because they would recognize the right of sovereign states to adopt differing
levels of regulatory protection, but they would significantly contribute to the
process of weeding out unnecessary divergences. The article focuses solely upon
potential innovations to be considered by regulatory agencies in the United
States, but similar principles apply to innovations contemplated by other
nations or trading blocs.
A. Categorizing Regulatory Disparities
In attempting to minimize or eliminate disparities between regulations
prevailing in different trade partners, it is imperative to recognize the multiple
potential causes for such divergences. In theory, regulatory differences might
reflect one of four separate causes, or some combination thereof:
1. Accidental Regulatory Divergences: Regulators seldom coordinate with
each of their overseas counterparts prior to adopting a regulation, and each
nation may adopt a differing approach as a mere matter of historical accident
25
rather than as a conscious decision.
2. Disparate Risk Assessments: Risk assessment is the process by which
regulators attempt to quantify both the magnitude of a risk and the probability
26
that it will take place. In theory, it is an objective process that is governed by
24. Exec. Order No. 13,609, § 2(d), 77 Fed. Reg. 26,413, 26,414 (May 4, 2012).
25. Adam C. Schlosser & Reeve T. Bull, Regulatory Cooperation in the TTIP, REGBLOG (Aug.
27, 2013), http://www.regblog.org/2013/08/27/27-schlosser-reeve-ttip/ (“Regulators often fail to engage
one another, and, once rules are on the books, they are extremely difficult to change.”).
26. E.g., Donald A. Brown, Superfund Cleanups, Ethics, and Environmental Risk Assessment, 16
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 181, 181 (1988); Joel D. Smith, Massachusetts v. EPA: A Change of Climate
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the scientific method. If regulators in one nation are relying upon more cuttingedge research than their counterparts elsewhere, their regulations may differ.
3. Disparate Risk Tolerances: Risk management is the process by which
regulators use the data produced during the risk-assessment phase and,
combining such data with relevant policy considerations, determine society’s
risk preferences and what regulations are required to achieve those
27
preferences. Unlike risk assessment, this process is essentially subjective and
28
ultimately depends upon the risk tolerance of the population at issue. If
separate citizenries exhibit disparate levels of tolerance, then regulations will
justifiably differ.
4. Political Considerations: Politics (rather than impartial, technocratic
agency decisionmaking) may ultimately influence regulations in two ways. First,
29
all agency powers ultimately derive from authorizing statutes, and Congress is
not obligated to conduct rigorous risk assessments or gauge the public risk
30
tolerance prior to enacting a statute. Agencies lack any authority to derogate
from statutory requirements. Thus, political compromises reached in Congress,
no matter how irrational or susceptible to rent-seeking by special interests, bind
the agencies. Of course, Congress often delegates quite broadly to agencies,
31
which then assume the policymaking mantle. Though reviewing courts will
scrutinize agencies’ risk-assessment conclusions, they typically accord a very
32
high degree of deference to scientific fact-findings, and agencies are not legally
at EPA Clouds the DC Circuit’s Review of Risk-Based Policy Decisions, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 653, 664
(2006).
27. Smith, supra note 26, at 664.
28. Admittedly, separating issues involving risk assessment from those concerning risk
management can be challenging. For instance, the level of confidence required to accept a proposition
as “proven” (for example, a 95% versus a 99% confidence interval), though fundamental to scientific
investigations, essentially represents a risk management determination. Carl F. Cranor, Science Courts,
Evidentiary Procedures and Mixed Science–Policy Decisions, 4 RISK 113, 126–28 (1993). Though
segregating problems into one category or the other is a difficult task, it is not impossible. See, e.g.,
BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER, IMPROVING THE USE OF SCIENCE IN REGULATORY POLICY 15–16
(2009),
http://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/default/files/BPC%20Science%20Report
%20fnl.pdf (arguing in favor of a clear distinction between scientific and policy issues). For instance,
risk assessment studies might focus solely on defining the relevant statistical parameters of a problem
and avoid any conclusions concerning causation. See Jeffrey N. Martin, Procedures for Decisionmaking
under Conditions of Scientific Uncertainty: The Science Court Proposal, 16 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 443, 505
(1979) (describing how a proposed science court might go about go about separating technical issues
from associated policy judgments).
29. C. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.22, at 39 (1985).
30. In this respect, the U.S. Congress differs somewhat from the EU Commission, which generally
conducts an impact analysis and often conducts outreach to relevant stakeholders and citizen groups
prior to proposing a new regulation or directive (which are roughly analogous to U.S. statutes).
RICHARD PARKER & ALBERTO ALEMANNO, TOWARDS EFFECTIVE REGULATORY COOPERATION
UNDER TTIP: A COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW OF THE EU AND US LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY
SYSTEMS 22–32 (2014), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/may/tradoc_152466.pdf.
31. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (“So long as Congress ‘shall lay down
by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [exercise the
delegated authority] is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of
legislative power.’” (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928))).
32. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 27 & n.18 (1976).
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obligated to ensure that their risk-management determinations properly reflect
the overall public risk tolerance (even assuming that could be straightforwardly
defined). Given the lack of any objective methodology for ascertaining risk
tolerance, the political preferences of government bureaucrats and of interest
groups seeking to influence the agency may greatly impact risk-management
33
determinations, both through the formal notice-and-comment process and
34
Because political
through informal contacts with agency officials.
considerations vary greatly from nation to nation (and even regulatory
authority to regulatory authority), they can contribute to regulatory disparities.
An effective approach to international regulatory cooperation must remain
closely attuned to the context in which any given divergence arises. The
potential contexts are arranged in ascending order of difficulty of international
regulatory cooperation efforts, with accidental regulatory disparities being the
most simple to resolve. Correcting “accidental” regulatory disparities and
ensuring that regulators are acting on the most up-to-date scientific information
is relatively straightforward, and this article builds a framework for achieving
these ends. Promoting regulatory convergence in the risk-management context
is considerably more challenging. This article also offers proposed reforms for
rationalizing risk management, helping to ensure that it is more closely attuned
to the public risk tolerance. Such changes, however, would not necessarily lead
to greater international convergence in all cases, though they likely would in
some instances. Political considerations, in turn, neither can nor should be
eliminated from the regulatory calculus. Nevertheless, this article’s proposed
improvements to the risk-management process would help mitigate the more
pernicious aspects of politicized agency decisionmaking, ensuring that
regulations reflect true public risk preferences rather than the whims of
bureaucrats or the desires of rent-seekers.
The remainder of this article focuses chiefly on methods for achieving
greater convergence of existing regulations. Obtaining convergence for
prospective regulations should be somewhat simpler to achieve insofar as
regulators come to internalize cooperative norms and seek input from overseas
33. Insofar as regulated entities influence the risk-management determination, the process is
highly susceptible to rent-seeking behavior. In addition to soliciting special protections, industry groups
may pursue a form of covert trade protectionism, lobbying for generally applicable regulations that
disproportionately benefit large, domestic firms at the expense of small businesses or foreign
competitors (for example, seeking a prohibition of all flavored cigarettes other than menthols, which
almost exclusively targets foreign producers). See HANS-HERMANN HOPPE, A THEORY OF SOCIALISM
AND CAPITALISM 105 (2010) (“The imposition of regulations . . . implies a redistribution of property
titles away from innovators and onto the established producers, products, and technologies.”); Watson
& James, supra note 6, at 3, 5.
34. See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 401–02 (1981) (holding that the Administrative
Procedure Act does not bar ex parte contacts between agency officials and outside parties in the
informal rulemaking context); ESA L. SFERRA-BONISTALLI, EX PARTE COMMUNICATIONS IN
INFORMAL RULEMAKING 25 (2014), http://www.acus.gov/report/final-ex-parte-communications-report
(“The D.C. Circuit’s cases dealing with ex parte contacts generally seem to agree that there is no
general prohibition on or specific procedures for addressing ex parte contacts in informal
rulemaking.”).
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counterparts and relevant stakeholders prior to adopting new rules.
Nevertheless, the general approach to classifying regulatory disparities by type
and soliciting appropriate stakeholder input should also guide the ongoing
process of promoting optimal convergence of future regulations.
B. The “Low-Hanging Fruit”: Accidental Regulatory Disparities
In a few instances, U.S. and foreign regulations do not differ because each
nation’s regulators rely on disparate scientific studies (risk assessment), because
each nation’s citizenry exhibits a unique level of risk tolerance (risk
management), or even because each nation’s politicians or bureaucrats have
consciously chosen to erect a unique set of policies. Rather, they differ because
trading partners have historically failed to coordinate regulatory policy and
therefore often enact divergent regulatory approaches merely as a matter of
historical accident. For instance, rather than requiring businesses to affix
different warning labels on hazardous products depending upon the version that
each nation has accepted, it would be far more effective for all nations to agree
35
upon a common design. In this case, harmonizing the regulations would
remove an unnecessary trade barrier and create opportunities for businesses on
both sides of the Atlantic.
Thus, to the extent a regulated entity identifies such a historical disparity
that is not justified by more accurate scientific data or by a determination to
provide a specific level of regulatory protection, it should have the opportunity
to petition the responsible agency and seek removal of the regulatory
discrepancy. The instrument by which the regulated entity identifies the
disparity need not comprise a formal rule-making petition under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which triggers a series of legal
36
obligations for the agency to dispose of the petition and justify its response.
Instead, the petition could merely involve the submission of a notice to the
agency urging it to scrutinize a particular regulation in light of disparate
approaches prevailing in one or more key trading partners. If the agency
concludes that the disparity could be eliminated or mitigated, the agency could
adopt a rule effectuating a revision; it could urge a trading partner to amend its
regulations; or, if altering the existing policy requires legislation, it could
encourage Congress to act. If, however, the agency decides that the disparity is
justified in light of differing risk-assessment or risk-management
determinations, it would announce this conclusion, and the challenging entity
would either abandon its claim or raise a further challenge to the underlying
risk analysis, as described in parts II.D–E.

35. An international standard-setting organization has in fact devised a set of common labels for
chemical safety. See generally UN Econ. Comm’n for Europe, Globally Harmonized System of
Classification and Labelling of Chemicals (GHS), U.N. Doc. ST/SG/AC.10/30/Rev.4 (2011),
http://www.unece.org/trans/danger/publi/ghs/ghs_rev00/00files_e.html. U.S. agencies have not required
the use of these globally accepted standards in all instances, though. Id.
36. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(e), 555(b), (e) (2012).
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Of course, the agency may be ill-served by adopting a policy of harmonizing
all such regulations with those prevailing in trading partners. In some instances,
37
the U.S. approach is objectively superior, and the optimal outcome would
entail a trading partner’s adopting U.S. regulations. Furthermore, amending the
38
regulations could create costs for certain regulated parties, which the net
benefits arising from harmonization may or may not offset. For those cases in
which reliance interests favor retaining the existing regulatory scheme
prevailing in one or more trading partners, a preferable approach may entail
adopting a series of mutual recognition agreements whereby each participant
acknowledges that the regime prevailing in another state is equivalent to its
own and recognizes compliance therewith as tantamount to compliance with the
39
domestic regulations.
C. Toward International Regulatory Cooperation in Risk Assessment
The scientific disciplines, though often perceived as monolithic and more-orless settled bodies of knowledge containing a series of objectively proven
“truths,” in reality involve robust substantive debates concerning appropriate
40
theories for explaining natural phenomena. Notwithstanding these substantive
differences, all credible natural scientists subscribe to the scientific method as
the procedural mechanism best suited to testing existing paradigms and
41
uncovering facts by which to challenge or support prevailing theories. Though
scientists will frequently propose disparate explanations for observed
phenomena, particularly in developing fields characterized by rapidly
37. For instance, the EU and the United States have adopted somewhat different approaches to
regulating the length of semi-tractor–trailers, such that the cab of European trucks generally sits atop
the engine compartment, whereas U.S. trucks place the cab behind the engine compartment. McCarthy,
supra note 2, at 9–10. The more aerodynamic U.S. design has better fuel economy. Id. at 10. The EU
merely adopting the U.S. scheme would therefore implement an objectively superior regulatory
approach while eliminating an unnecessary trade barrier.
38. In the tractor–trailer example, retooling EU truck manufacturing facilities to adopt the U.S.
design may prove more costly than the combined savings of superior fuel economy and enhanced trade
justify.
39. Kalypso Nicolaidis & Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Mutual Recognition Regimes:
Governance without Global Government, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263, 266–67 (2005).
[M]utual recognition represents the operation of a third, “middle way” of transnational
economic governance, one that is already happening in a global economic order—that of
recognizing foreign regulatory determinations implicit in the import of traded goods and
services. Mutual recognition principles constitute an exercise of the territorial principle of
national treatment, and a cooperative, “mutualized” approach to the inherent demand for,
and challenge of, extraterritoriality in a global economic order.
Id.
40. As the famed historian of science Thomas Kuhn observed, the natural sciences are
characterized less by a sustained progression toward the discovery of universal laws or principles than
by a series of paradigm shifts by which successive generations of scientists devise models to explain
observed phenomenon that more fully accord with the prevailing “facts” perceived by their
contemporary colleagues. See generally THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC
REVOLUTIONS (2012).
41. JOHN L. CAMPBELL, INTRODUCTION TO SCIENCE AND THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD 11 (2008)
(cataloguing the scientific method’s rise to general acceptance in the community of scientists).
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expanding knowledge, they will agree upon the need to marshal empirical
evidence to test their hypotheses.
In this light, scientists addressing issues of risk assessment should, in theory,
be capable of deciding upon an objectively optimal result given the scientific
data available. Of course, some lag between scientific innovations and their
integration into regulatory decisionmaking is inevitable. Were researchers to
prove beyond cavil an ineluctable connection between cellular telephone usage
and brain tumors, regulators would inevitably take several months or years to
enact regulations designed to mitigate these harms (and may never do so if, in
conducting the risk-management determination, they deem the risk to be
tolerable or the personal autonomy interests in unfettered telephone access to
be sufficiently important). This phenomenon is largely a result of the informal
agency procedures that Professor Wendy Wagner has described as “stopping
rules,” that is, points at which agencies will decide to foreclose consideration of
42
any additional evidence in order to render a regulatory decision.
Some use of stopping rules is inevitable: in a Kuhnian universe, any agency
that seeks absolute certainty prior to regulating will not regulate at all, for the
paradigms of science are constantly cycling through a process of creative
43
destruction. Nevertheless, scientific understanding will evolve over time as
existing paradigms are shored up with additional confirmatory experimentation
and old paradigms eventually yield to new ones; an agency cannot merely
establish policy based on the best science currently available and then adhere to
that policy indefinitely. Rather, the agency must constantly readjust its
44
regulations to respond to new evidence.
Regulators in each sovereign nation will presumably set somewhat different
stopping rules than those prevailing in sister nations, and new research may be
more readily accessible in some countries than in others. Thus, regulatory
disparities are likely to prevail in the lag time between the introduction of new

42. WENDY WAGNER, SCIENCE IN REGULATION: A STUDY OF AGENCY DECISIONMAKING
APPROACHES 26–27 (2013), http://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Science%20in%20
Regulation_Final%20Report_2_18_13_0.pdf; see also Sheila Jasanoff, Transparency in Public Science:
Purposes, Reasons, Limits, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 21, 38 (2006) (identifying a lack of stopping
rules as creating a situation in which irrelevant public input can bog down the scientific decision-making
process).
43. See Wagner, supra note 42, at 26.
Science-based dialog, if done in keeping with the norms of science, has no clear stopping
point. Science is continually evolving and, in theory, policy should be constantly evolving with
it . . . . Since scientific questions will never be resolved completely, a decision subjected to
stopping rules will be revisited again later, through an adaptive process that considers the new
evidence and adjusts the original rule or decision as necessary.
Id.
44. See id. at 26, 124 (The resulting regulatory decision will be revisited with new evidence at some
future date, often established in the stopping rule itself.”); see also Administrative Conference of the
United States, Recommendation 2013-3, Science in the Administrative Process, ¶ 4, 78 Fed. Reg.
41,352, 41,358 (July 10, 2013) (recommending that agencies not only establish “checkpoints” at which
they will render a decision on the basis of the available evidence but also identify when they will
“reopen consideration of research or debate”).
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scientific research and its integration into the regulations of all nations.
Information-sharing among scientists worldwide can somewhat mitigate this
problem by ensuring that new studies will diffuse as rapidly as possible across
international boundaries. In that light, the Administrative Conference of the
United States has recommended that regulatory scientists work with their
international counterparts to share data sets, divide responsibility for
conducting otherwise duplicative tests, and achieve the efficiencies that arise
45
from maintaining a global network of researchers. Nevertheless, the key
stumbling block to ensuring that all regulatory regimes reflect the most up-todate risk-assessment data is more likely to arise from inertia associated with
effectuating regulatory change than from inadequate coordination amongst
scientists across borders.
One possible means of ensuring that U.S. agencies rely upon the most up-todate scientific research would be for regulated entities and other parties to file a
petition for rulemaking whenever new information emerges that casts into
doubt the viability of risk assessments underpinning existing regulations. The
APA specifically authorizes this mechanism of spurring regulatory activity,
providing that “[e]ach agency shall give an interested person the right to
46
petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule.” Though agency
denials of such petitions are subject to “‘extremely limited’ and ‘highly
47
deferential’” review, the Supreme Court has recently shown a willingness to
scrutinize agencies’ refusals to undertake rulemakings and to more closely parse
48
their purported justifications for inaction.
A petition for rulemaking may prove appropriate for cases in which an
agency refuses to address new scientific evidence, but it is a rather blunt
49
mechanism that is employed infrequently. Once the petition has been filed, the
50
agency is legally obligated to provide some form of response, though the
justification can be relatively pro forma for petitions that present little to no
51
argumentation warranting a formal reply. The process can become even more
protracted and convoluted if the petitioner challenges the agency’s denial of the
52
petition on judicial review. In this light, a different solution that allows the
agencies and challenging entities to reach a mutually agreeable solution and
45. Administrative Conference of the United States, Recommendation 2011-6, International
Regulatory Cooperation, ¶¶ 3–6, 77 Fed. Reg. 2257, 2260–61 (Jan. 17, 2012).
46. 5 U.S.C. § 553(e).
47. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 527–28 (2007) (quoting Nat’l Customs Brokers &
Forwarders Ass’n v. United States, 883 F.2d 93, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
48. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 527–35 (finding the EPA’s rejection of a rulemaking petition
urging the EPA to regulate motor vehicle greenhouse gas emissions to be “arbitrary and capricious”).
49. William V. Luneburg, Petitioning Federal Agencies for Rulemaking: An Overview of
Administrative and Judicial Practice and Some Recommendations for Improvement, 1988 WISC. L. REV.
1, 58 (1988).
50. 5 U.S.C. § 555(b), (e).
51. See id. § 555(e) (requiring only a “brief statement of the grounds for denial” and permitting
summary denial when the reasons therefor are “self-explanatory”).
52. 5 U.S.C. §§ 704, 706.
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that relies upon alternative means of dispute resolution in the event of a
disagreement may pretermit the need for a formal petition for rulemaking,
though that device would remain available as a last resort.
As in the case of accidental disparities, the agency might create an informal
process—separate from the rulemaking petition process—that would allow
stakeholders to submit evidence bearing upon the continued validity of agency
54
risk assessments. If a stakeholder identifies a disparity between a regulation
adopted by the United States and the approach pursued by one or more trading
partners and can demonstrate that the discrepancy has arisen as a result of a
U.S. agency’s reliance on outdated technical information, then the agency could
update or amend its regulation to reflect the current wisdom of the scientific
community. If, by contrast, the agency demonstrates that it has relied upon
more up-to-date science, or that its reliance upon outdated information has not
adversely affected its regulations, then the stakeholder should accept the
agency’s determination.
In certain circumstances, of course, the agency and stakeholder may
interpret the same evidence differently, resulting in a conflict that requires
calling upon the services of an outside adjudicator. In the scientific context, the
“gold standard” for deciding among competing technical claims is the peer55
review process. Federal agencies regularly convene peer-review panels as
56
advisory committees subject to the Federal Advisory Committee Act, and the
53. The Administrative Conference of the United States has urged federal agencies to seek out
opportunities for utilizing alternative dispute-resolution mechanisms to address disputes more
efficiently. See Administrative Conference of the United States, Recommendation 86-3, Agencies’ Use
of Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution, ¶ 1, 51 Fed. Reg. 25,641, 25,643 (July 16, 1986).
Administrative agencies, where not inconsistent with statutory authority, should adopt
the alternative methods discussed in this recommendation for resolving a broad range of
issues. These include many matters that arise as a part of formal or informal adjudication,
in rulemaking, in issuing or revoking permits, and in settling disputes, including litigation
brought by or against the government.
Id.
54. In order for a party that wishes to introduce new scientific evidence to determine whether the
agency has already considered its data, the party must be able to ascertain the research upon which the
agency relied. Though the Freedom of Information Act technically only requires an agency to disclose
any records upon the receipt of a formal request (assuming that none of the various exceptions is met),
5 U.S.C. § 552, agencies can and should voluntarily provide nonconfidential information related to
scientific conclusions—including relevant studies and the data undergirding those studies—in order to
apprise the public of their decision-making processes. See, e.g., Administrative Conference of the
United States, Recommendation 2013-3, Science in the Administrative Process, ¶ 3, 78 Fed. Reg.
41,352, 41,358 (July 10, 2013) (recommending that each agency “identify and make publicly available . .
. references to the scientific literature, underlying data, models, and research results that it
considered”). This should include both studies upon which the agency relied as well as studies that the
agency considered but that did not ultimately inform its final decision. Id. When agencies rely upon
privately funded research, they also should encourage the preparer of the research to disclose the
underlying data. Id. ¶ 10.
55. Memorandum from Joshua B. Bolten, Director, Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Issuance of
OMB’s “Final Information Quality Bulletin for Peer Review,” M-05-03 3–5 (Dec. 16, 2004),
http://www.cio.noaa.gov/services_programs/pdfs/OMB_Peer_Review_Bulletin_m05-03.pdf.
56. See Types of Federal Advisory Committees, U.S. GEN. SERVS. ADMIN.,
http://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/248961 (last visited Feb. 11, 2014) (listing scientific advisory boards
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agency could initiate this process in the event of a dispute with a stakeholder
involving the scientific evidence underlying a given regulation. If the panel’s
conclusions ultimately call into question the risk assessment undergirding a
particular rule, the agency would not necessarily be bound to amend its
regulation. Numerous considerations other than the technical accuracy of
underlying scientific studies animate agency decisionmaking, but the
challenging party could cite the panel’s conclusion as evidence if it elected to
pursue a petition for rulemaking. Conversely, if the panel decides in favor of the
agency, the challenger would ideally abandon any effort to amend the
regulation, and the agency could cite the panel’s conclusions if the challenger
nevertheless persisted in filing a petition for rulemaking.
This procedure would allow agencies to leverage the expertise of privatesector entities to identify new scientific developments justifying reassessment of
existing regulations, thereby conserving agency resources that otherwise would
be dedicated to this task. Of course, adopting the contemplated reforms would
also create offsetting costs for agencies, likely requiring them to reassess
regulations more frequently than they otherwise would. The government could
presumably further reduce its costs by requiring any challenging entity to defray
the expenses incurred in connection with the expert panel. Unfortunately,
placing the pecuniary burden on challenging entities would favor relatively
powerful concerns, such as large businesses, and potentially disadvantage less
favorably positioned entities such as public interest organizations or small
businesses. In this light, agencies might create a “superfund” mechanism,
assessing a fee for all challenges filed by industry groups or other relatively
affluent entities that would cover the costs of challenges they raise as well as
challenges brought by individual citizens, public interest organizations, small
businesses, or other relatively impecunious entities (perhaps implementing a
mechanism whereby such groups could seek a waiver of the relevant fees).
Importantly, such a system for challenging the technical bases of agency
regulations need not be confined to the international regulatory cooperation
context. Though a disparity between the scientific analysis undergirding U.S.
and overseas regulations may serve as prima facie evidence that either the
American or foreign approach is outdated in light of new discoveries, scientific
evidence may justify a readjustment of existing regulations even in the absence
of such an international disparity.
D. Toward International Regulatory Cooperation in Risk Management
Risk-assessment problems can theoretically be resolved objectively by
analyzing the science underlying differing approaches and determining which
accords most closely with the prevailing state of scientific knowledge. By
contrast, risk-management problems defy such solutions and ultimately depend,
in theory, upon the overall level of risk tolerance exhibited by the general

as one of the major types of federal advisory committees).
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public whom national governments purport to protect.
In issuing a risk-management determination, national governments are, in
essence, rendering a normative judgment concerning the level of risk to which a
society is willing to expose its citizens (and concomitantly determining the
amount of societal resources that will be dedicated to mitigating that risk,
thereby potentially limiting economic growth and foreclosing the possibility of
57
assigning scarce resources to addressing other risks). In most modern
governments, which necessarily rely upon some scheme of representation, the
sovereign people have effectively delegated that decision-making power to
58
elected representatives. In the United States, the courts traditionally required
that those representatives elected by the people (that is, Congress) make all
overarching policy decisions, prohibiting the delegation of that function to
unelected bureaucrats in the executive branch through the so-called “non59
delegation doctrine.” This prohibition, however, has essentially become a dead
60
letter, and the Supreme Court has now openly acknowledged that agencies can
exercise a policymaking role so long as Congress articulates an “intelligible
61
principle” to guide that function.
In theory, agency officials are well-positioned to translate the public risk
tolerance into an appropriate set of risk-management determinations, taking
62
account of the general public sentiment (through soliciting public comments,
conducting opinion polls, or simply observing the public reaction to major
events) while correcting for the cognitive errors that may skew lay
decisionmaking. In reality, regulators seldom undertake a formal process of
determining the public risk tolerance, and they are not necessarily wellpositioned to translate such public preferences into a risk-management
determination, for several reasons. First, regulators may be bound by statutes
that reflect certain political commitments rather than a carefully reasoned riskmanagement determination. Second, even where agencies enjoy considerable
discretion in rendering a risk-management determination (because Congress
has delegated authority very broadly), regulators may allow their own political
views to influence the process of ascertaining the public risk tolerance. By the
same token, regulators are susceptible to capture by special interests, which,
57. For discussions of the problem of risk–risk tradeoffs, see John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert
Wiener, Confronting Risk Tradeoffs, in RISK VS. RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH & THE
ENVIRONMENT 1, 1 (John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., 1995); see also Richard W.
Parker, Grading the Government, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1345, 1403–04 (2003); Cass R. Sunstein, Health–
Health Tradeoffs, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1533, 1535 (1996).
58. Edward L. Rubin, Getting Past Democracy, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 711, 718 (2001).
59. See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 521–23 (1935);
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935).
60. See PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN AND BYSE’S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 66 (10th ed.
2003) (“Nearly two centuries of nondelegation caselaw reveals a Court that consistently talks a harsh
line against the delegation of ‘legislative power,’ but rarely finds a statutory delegation it can’t
sustain.”).
61. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372, 378 (1989).
62. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c).
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among other things, may overwhelm the agency with information favoring their
63
preferred outcome and thereby skew the decision-making process. Domestic
industries may devise a nominally welfare-enhancing justification for
advocating a risk-management determination that preserves their existing
64
market share, and agency officials may be influenced to adopt policies favored
by such groups.
A concerted effort to comprehensively assess all known risk factors
worldwide and allocate scarce resources so as to achieve an optimal level of
65
overall societal risk reduction would, in theory, resolve this dilemma. But it
would be perceived as profoundly antidemocratic insofar as it would require
insulating regulators from public pressure, thereby empowering them to act
even in the face of strong public opposition. Furthermore, government
regulators tend to apply a highly abstracted risk calculus that relies only upon
one or a few factors (for example, the number of deaths prevented annually),
whereas the general public uses a much more complex, impressionistic model
66
that may rely upon a significantly larger number of factors.
To some extent, the discrepancy between expert and lay decisionmaking
may reflect the greater susceptibility of the latter group to cognitive errors. For
instance, laypersons may be misguided by the framing of a particular question,
whereas experts will apply a more rigorous, statistical calculus that corrects for

63. Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59 DUKE L.J.
1321, 1324–25 (2010).
64. Watson & James, supra note 6, at 5.
65. The U.S. regulatory system attempts to achieve a more objective analysis by requiring
executive branch agencies to conduct cost-benefit analysis of all proposed rules that result in an
economic impact of $100 million or more and by tasking OIRA with reviewing these analyses and
coordinating among such agencies. See generally Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4,
1993) (“[I]n choosing among alternative regulatory approaches, agencies should select those
approaches that maximize net benefits (including potential economic, environmental, public health and
safety, and other advantages; distributive impacts; and equity), unless a statute requires another
regulatory approach.”). Nevertheless, the system is far from comprehensive because it generally only
applies to rules with a large economic impact, does not cover rules promulgated by independent
regulatory agencies, and only governs prospective rules (though EO 13,610 and other directives have
encouraged agencies to undertake retrospective review of existing rules). Though the principle of
proportionality also imposes some discipline on decisionmaking in the EU, Christoph Henkel, The
Allocation of Powers in the European Union: A Closer Look at the Principle of Subsidiary, 20
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 359, 374–78 (2002), and the Commission conducts an impact assessment (which
may or may not quantitatively assess potential costs and benefits) prior to putting forth proposed
legislation, PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION:
RULEMAKING 63–71 (2008), European nations also lack any comprehensive system for dedicating
regulatory resources to their optimal uses.
66. See Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV.
1, 55–56 (1995).
There is a strikingly consistent finding in risk studies: laypeople assess risk through different
value frameworks than those implicitly embedded in expert approaches. Laypeople do not
look only or even primarily to expected annual mortality; they look as well to a number of
factors determining the acceptability of different risks in different contexts.
Id.
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this perception error. Nevertheless, in many cases, the layperson’s approach is
not objectively worse than the expert’s. For instance, the State of Oregon
created an advisory panel to rank the severity of potential adverse health
outcomes and then used the ranking to determine Medicaid funding for such
68
ailments. Though an expert would likely approach this problem by applying an
objective metric, such as the likelihood of each disease to cause premature
death, the public considered additional factors such as the preventability of
each disease, its age of onset, and the extent to which it interferes with the
69
enjoyment of life. Hence, although agency experts act as proxies for the
general public in ascertaining overall risk tolerance, their decisions are likely to
diverge somewhat from true public preferences.
In this light, a preferable alternative may be to ensure that risk-management
decisions are actually informed by the true societal risk tolerance by facilitating
communication of citizens’ views to regulators, while nevertheless correcting for
the cognitive errors that skew individual decisionmaking. Expanding such input
would help promote public risk-management decisions that hew more closely to
the underlying risk tolerance of the general citizenry, but it would not, in
theory, inherently lead to greater regulatory convergence (and may ultimately
expand divergence) between different nations. Nevertheless, it would ensure
that any regulatory divergence that survives reflects the genuine will of the
general public and not merely the predilections of government regulators or the
downstream effects of rent-seeking by domestic special interests pursuing
protection from foreign competition. Furthermore, in devising a mechanism
that can minimize the effects of cognitive errors while ascertaining the risk
tolerance of members of the public, one need not be overly sanguine to assume
that citizens in relatively modern, industrialized nations would likely prefer
similar levels of regulatory protection in a broad array of areas. Thus, this
mechanism would perhaps mitigate some of the wide gulfs in transatlantic
regulatory policy that presently exist.
Administrative law scholarship contains a number of proposals for
enhancing citizen input in agency policymaking. In theory, in notice-andcomment rulemakings, agencies could merely tabulate the number of comments
favoring and opposing a particular policy and select the more popular option.
Nonetheless, scholars and agencies have been well-nigh uniform in rejecting the
70
proposition that the notice-and-comment process is a plebiscite, given the
67. To illustrate, an average member of the public may view a “survival rate of 90%” as superior
to a “risk of death of 10%,” though an expert can easily see that these two states are identical.
RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH,
WEALTH, & HAPPINESS 36–37 (2009).
68. Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 66, at 92–94.
69. See id. at 57 (listing factors other than increased mortality risk that public decisionmakers
consider germane).
70. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE FED. REGISTER, A GUIDE TO THE RULEMAKING PROCESS 6,
https://www.federalregister.gov/uploads/2011/01/the_rulemaking_process.pdf
(“The
notice-andcomment process . . . is not like a ballot initiative or an up-or-down vote in a legislature. An agency is
not permitted to base its final rule on the number of comments in support of the rule over those in
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intractable self-selection issues involved. Rather, the academic proposals rely
either upon agency officials to screen public input and identify meritorious
issues or upon some representation scheme whereby a subset of the public is
selected to speak on behalf of the citizenry as a whole. For instance, Professor
Nina Mendelson has proposed that agency officials tabulate public comments
and carefully consider public policy preferences expressed therein when the
comments are numerous, strongly favor a particular outcome, implicate an issue
germane to the agency’s statutory authorization, are coherent and persuasive,
71
and point in a direction other than that initially favored by the agency.
Professor Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar has advocated a process relying both
on selecting a subsample of the populace to speak on behalf of the public and
on empowering agency officials to separate the wheat from the chaff in the
72
input received. Specifically, he has proposed creating an independent agency
to select a random or stratified sample of individuals to furnish input on
73
especially critical rulemakings. Attorneys would serve as “regulatory public
defenders” and present the relevant information supporting and undermining
an agency proposal to the deliberating group. The attorneys would then identify
the primary concerns articulated by the public participants and offer potential
74
revisions to the proposed rule to address those concerns.
In a previous article, I explored another potential application of the
representation model: assigning advisory committees composed of a
demographically diverse group of citizens the task of debating a particular
question of agency policymaking and reaching a collective decision on the
75
appropriate course of action. The agency or an impartial body acting on its
behalf would assemble a small panel of citizens (likely no larger than twentyfive participants) and select a set of experts to brief the participants on the
76
relevant information underlying a risk-management problem. The committee
members, led by a moderator, would then debate the key issues and ultimately
decide upon an overall recommendation, ideally reaching unanimity or near

opposition to it.”); Cynthia R. Farina et al., Rulemaking 2.0, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 395, 430 (2011)
(“The assumption that rulemaking is a plebiscite has plagued first generation e-rulemaking.”); Stuart
W. Shulman, The Internet Still Might (But Probably Won’t) Change Everything, 1 I/S: J. L. & POL’Y FOR
INFO. SOC’Y 111, 138 (2004) (“Administrative law scholars worry about a perceived shift away from
agency discretion and expert decisions toward the politics and the psychology of plebiscites. They are
not alone. At a recent agency focus group, one participant stressed, ‘Rulemaking is not a
democracy.’”).
71. Nina A. Mendelson, Rulemaking, Democracy, and Torrents of E-Mail, 79 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1343, 1375 (2010).
72. Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 411
(2005).
73. Id. at 491.
74. Id.
75. See generally Reeve T. Bull, Making the Administrative State “Safe for Democracy”: A
Theoretical and Practical Analysis of Citizen Participation in Agency Decisionmaking, 65 ADMIN. L.
REV. 611 (2013).
76. Id. at 641–42.
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consensus but casting a majority vote if necessity dictates. Their prescriptions
would not bind government agencies but rather would serve to elucidate the
78
policy preferences of the regulated public.
In the international regulatory cooperation context, any of the
aforementioned systems could, in theory, provide a mechanism for correcting
historical divergences between international regulatory regimes that may not
ultimately reflect the true underlying risk tolerance of the general public.
Initially, a private party would identify a disparity between U.S. regulations and
those of a trading partner. Agencies could arrange an informal process by which
individuals could identify such disparities without submitting a petition for
79
rulemaking. In many if not most instances, the agency could provide a
summary justification for its regulatory approach. For example, the U.S.
approach may differ from that of some trading partners but not others and
moving closer to the system of one trading partner would pull regulations away
from those of other trading partners. In other cases, U.S. firms may attempt to
weaken regulatory protections by pointing to lax regulatory regimes in
developing nations, and agencies would be justified in summarily rejecting any
proposal to erode regulatory protections to avoid a “race to the bottom” of
progressively weakened standards.
For instances in which the U.S. approach substantively differs from that of a
large number of trading partners with similarly strong levels of regulatory
protection, individuals might file comments urging the agency to invoke one of
the aforementioned citizen consultation procedures (or some combination or
variation thereof). The optimal type of consultation would likely depend on the
nature of the policy-making task. Professor Mendelson’s model may prove ideal
when the agency cannot dedicate extensive resources to constructing a citizen
advisory body and wants to obtain a general sense of the public reaction to a
proposed policy rather than determine the precise percentage of individuals
favoring the proposal with a high degree of precision. Professor Cuéllar’s model
may be preferable when the public might articulate certain concerns with a
policy proposal but may lack the sophistication to grapple with the competing
tradeoffs and offer a recommendation to the agency. My representation model,
in turn, may prove optimal when the agency is willing to allocate the resources
to determine precisely how a demographically representative sampling of
citizens will react to a proposal and when the problem is sufficiently

77. Id. at 644, 651–52.
78. Id. at 654.
79. Agencies could structure this informal comment–submission process in any number of ways.
Most simply, the agency could create a comment page on its website for collecting such submissions. If
it received a particularly large number of comments, it might utilize IdeaScale software to allow other
users to rank submissions, thereby effectively prescreening comments to highlight particularly
promising ideas. More formally, the agency might appoint an ombudsman to screen citizen submissions
and identify those that are sufficiently well developed to merit consideration. See generally
Administrative Conference of the United States, Recommendation 90-2, The Ombudsman in Federal
Agencies, 55 Fed. Reg. 34,211 (Aug. 22, 1990).
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straightforward that such citizens can come to a proposed resolution. As with
the risk-assessment panels, the agency might implement a scheme whereby
challenging parties bear the costs of procuring public input and less affluent
entities use a “superfund” mechanism to subsidize challenges.
After the agency has solicited public input, it should then consider the views
received when determining whether to effectuate any change in underlying
policy. In many instances, citizens may express a level of risk tolerance
justifying adoption of a regulatory approach that more closely resembles that of
a key trading partner, in which case the agency should consider the propriety of
amending its regulations accordingly. In other cases, citizens may ultimately
prefer the stronger or weaker protections that prevail in the United States, and
the agency will have acquired additional evidence justifying the approach it has
adopted. In the former set of circumstances, however, the agency should not
necessarily immediately amend its regulations to achieve greater regulatory
convergence. Any number of factors may justify a disparate approach even if
the public risk tolerance favors convergence: the authorizing legislation may
bind the agency to the current regime (in which case the agency may urge
Congress to amend the statute that forecloses the proposed action); the agency
may lack the resources to alter the regulations or to operate the alternative
regime once it is implemented; or the alternative approach, though nominally
more efficient, may create separate problems (for example, it may have an
especially deleterious effect on small businesses). Thus, enhanced public input
in risk-management determinations is not intended as a panacea designed to
eradicate regulatory divergence but rather as a mechanism for ascertaining the
true public risk tolerance and for ensuring that agencies take this information
into account when contemplating whether achieving enhanced regulatory
convergence is feasible or desirable. Public input, therefore, both promotes
greater responsiveness on the part of agencies and depoliticizes the riskmanagement process, diminishing the likelihood that bureaucrats’ political
preferences or rent-seeking activities by regulated firms will control the final
outcome.
In the event that an agency’s outreach efforts produce evidence justifying a
revision to underlying regulations and the agency fails to act, the challenging
party may either cite this evidence to Congress if a statutory amendment is
required or file a petition for rulemaking relying upon the evidence. Given the
numerous factors beyond public risk tolerance that may affect an agency’s
decisionmaking, a court reviewing denial of a petition for rulemaking should
80
tender a high degree of deference to the agency’s determination. Nevertheless,
if the agency can offer no compelling evidence justifying its decision to act in a
manner contrary to public risk preferences, then a court may ultimately set
80. See Eric Biber, Two Sides of the Same Coin: Judicial Review of Administrative Agency Action
and Inaction, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 461, 467–69 (2008) (concluding that judicial deference is particularly
appropriate when courts are determining whether an agency properly allocated its regulatory
resources).
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aside the rejection of such a petition as “arbitrary and capricious.” Though
successful challenges would likely be somewhat rare given the high degree of
82
deference accorded to agency dispositions of petitions for rulemaking, the
existence of such a mechanism for challenging agency determinations would
presumably provide a strong incentive for agencies to attempt to ascertain the
true public risk tolerance initially.
Finally, as in the risk-assessment arena, this set of procedures could
theoretically be invoked outside of the international regulatory cooperation
context. Regulations may underprotect or overprotect the general public in
light of true risk preferences regardless of whether they differ from those
prevailing overseas. Examining the broader application of this process is
beyond the scope of this article. Though a more widespread use of the
aforementioned methodology in risk-management decisions may ultimately
prove viable, it is particularly appropriate in the international regulatory
cooperation context because the existence of a regulatory divergence between
developed nations suggests that reasonable alternative approaches exist.
III
POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES
International regulatory cooperation initiatives almost universally disavow
any interest in eroding existing regulatory protections. Yet pro-regulatory
groups have expressed concern that such efforts will, in practice, precipitate a
“race to the bottom” wherein trading partners agree to adopt the least traderestrictive alternative, even if it provides scant protection for the overall public
83
welfare. In addition, efforts to promote international regulatory convergence
within the United States may be minimally effective or, worse,
counterproductive if regulators in major trading partners do not reciprocate.
Finally, the procedures for identifying unnecessary regulatory divergences
highlighted in the previous part are not costless endeavors, and the
contemplated reforms may impose a financial burden on agencies. This part
addresses each of these potential objections in turn.

81. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
82. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 527–28 (2007).
83. See, e.g., David Hunter, Executive Order Embraces International Regulatory Race to the
Bottom
as
Official
Administration
Policy,
CPRBLOG
(May
2,
2012),
http://progressivereform.org/CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog=0F52AD3D-CB5E-DB59-373FC982EEFE109C.
The priority for regulators is clear. Scour our regulations and compare them to those of our
trading partners . . . to identify those areas of ‘unnecessary’ differences. What then? Eliminate
the differences by rewriting U.S. regulations to those of our trading partners, so many of
whom have terrible worker safety and environmental policies . . . .
Id.; Jessica Randall, International Regulatory Cooperation: Will Harmonization Protect the Public or
FINE
PRINT
(May
3,
2012),
Prioritize
Corporate
Profits?,
THE
http://www.foreffectivegov.org/node/12071 (“[T]oo often, international regulatory cooperation
becomes a race to the bottom, elevating corporate trade concerns over public protections.”).
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A. Potential Pro-Industry Bias of International Regulatory Cooperation
Each of the contemplated mechanisms for improving international
regulatory cooperation explored in part II is designed to be objective: the
Federal Advisory Committee Act mandates that scientific peer review boards
84
commissioned by federal agencies be balanced, and agencies should structure
programs designed to ascertain public preferences on risk-management issues in
a way that ensures the public’s access to relevant information representing all
credible points of view on a particular regulatory problem. The decision-making
processes of either professional or lay advisory groups or of public commenters
should not be inherently biased in a pro- or antiregulatory direction.
Nevertheless, the proposed reforms rely upon private parties to initiate the
process of scrutinizing existing regulations, and industry groups may have
stronger incentives to exploit these mechanisms than would public interest or
85
other pro-regulatory organizations. Though industry- or public-interestinitiated examinations of existing regulations may enjoy roughly equal
probabilities of success, industry groups may simply bring more challenges.
Even accepting the premise that industry groups will be more capable of
marshalling resources to initiate reviews of existing regulations, agencies can
nevertheless structure the proceedings to ensure that corporate interests do not
dominate the process. First, at least for challenges to historical regulatory
divergences and prevailing risk assessments, the agency might stipulate that any
regulatory alternative adopted must prove at least as protective as that it
replaces. Indeed, many of the proposals for enhanced international regulatory
cooperation have done precisely this. For instance, Administrative Conference
Recommendation 2011-6 provides that agencies should pursue cooperation only
86
“when doing so does not detract from their missions.” In the risk-management
arena, an agency may ultimately adopt a regulation providing weaker public
protection, but it would do so only in light of evidence that the public is willing
to tolerate a higher level of risk than the preexisting regime allowed.
Second, regulatory agencies themselves are explicitly tasked with protecting
87
the public welfare, and they would therefore have an incentive to ensure that a
scientific or citizen advisory committee or public commenters had access to all
relevant information supporting the prevailing state of affairs in the face of an
industry challenge to an existing regulation.
Third and finally, public interest groups and other nonprofit organizations
84. See 5 U.S.C. App. § 5(b)(2) (requiring that membership of federal advisory committees “be
fairly balanced in terms of the points of view represented and the functions to be performed”).
85. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 56–60 (2012) (demonstrating how special interests that experience concentrated
effects—either positive or negative—as a result of legislative activity are more likely to lobby
lawmakers than are interests that experience diffuse effects).
86. Administrative Conference of the United States, Recommendation 2011-6, International
Regulatory Cooperation, ¶ 1, 77 Fed. Reg. 2257, 2260 (Jan. 17, 2012).
87. Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437,
440–41 (2003).
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that are capable of pooling resources and advocating positions that regulatory
88
beneficiaries might not otherwise defend will undoubtedly seek enhanced
regulatory convergence in contexts in which key trading partners provide
stronger regulatory protections, for example, European environmental or labor
89
laws. The costs of merely filing a comment urging an agency to examine a
particular regulatory disparity are likely to be minimal and well within the
means of most public interest groups. If the comment prompts the agency to
convene an expert or citizen advisory committee, the agency might employ a
“superfund” mechanism that would cover the costs for public interest initiated
challenges, as explored in part II.D.
B. Potential for Unreciprocated Regulatory Reform
The various mechanisms described in part II focus exclusively on spurring
U.S. agencies to pursue enhanced regulatory convergence. In theory, U.S.
entities (and even foreign entities) may exploit these procedures to remove
unnecessary trade barriers in the United States while regulators in other trading
partners merely maintain their preexisting approaches. At least at a superficial
level, this unilateral act of largesse would ostensibly place the United States at a
disadvantage vis-à-vis its trading partners. Closer analysis, however, suggests
that even such an unreciprocated act of regulatory convergence might provide
90
competitive benefits for the U.S. economy. Such actions would undoubtedly
increase costs for regulators, who must invest resources in amending the
relevant rules, and for businesses that must alter their activities in order to
comply with the new regime. Nonetheless, they also would create new
opportunities for U.S. firms, whose exported products would now comply with
regulations prevailing in key trading partners, and for consumers, who would
enjoy expanded access to imported products. In this sense, the case for
enhanced regulatory convergence resembles that for decreased tariffs: some
economists have contended that the costs to protected industries of unilaterally
revoking tariffs are far exceeded by the benefits to other industries and
91
consumers (even if other nations retain their tariffs in full force).
Nevertheless, if the United States can win similar concessions among trading
partners by demanding reciprocity prior to erecting such a program for
achieving regulatory convergence domestically, it should do so—for example,

88. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics without Romance: Implications of Public Choice
Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 304–05 (1988) (explaining how public interest
groups can overcome collective action problems in private litigation).
89. David Marsden, Labor Institutions, Risk Sharing, and Wage Inequality: A Comment on Blau
and Kahn, 23 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 1063, 1065 (2002) (recounting an argument that U.S. “labor
institutions are less interventionalist” than their European counterparts); Wiener, supra note 15, at
213–14 (noting that U.S. environmental laws are popularly perceived as weaker than their European
counterparts).
90. See HAZLITT, supra note 11, at 80–84 (noting that unilateral tariff reduction can provide
economic benefits even if it goes unreciprocated).
91. TIM HARFORD, THE UNDERCOVER ECONOMIST 223 (2012).
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by only permitting challenges to regulations that differ from those in nations
that have adopted similar mechanisms for reviewing their regulations. If
successful, the United States would create opportunities for evangelizing the
92
principles undergirding the U.S. regulatory system and open new markets for
U.S. firms. Indeed, the negotiations connected with the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership (TTIP) have sought to establish formal mechanisms by
which all parties to the agreement will implement reforms aimed at promoting
93
regulatory convergence or intercompatibility, and U.S. negotiators should seek
similar concessions wherever possible.
C. Possible Costs for Agencies
The reforms described in part II could create considerable costs for
agencies. Though the expense of operating advisory committees can be
minimized through use of modern technologies such as video-conferencing and
web discussion boards, the agency would still face nontrivial costs in convening
both expert and citizen committees, particularly in the initial aftermath of
94
enacting the proposed reforms. Nevertheless, any expenditures associated with
reassessing existing regulations for unnecessary international disparities would
partially be offset, if not eclipsed, by savings arising from enhanced
international coordination in enacting new regulations. In the risk-assessment
arena, U.S. agencies occasionally duplicate analysis performed by private
groups and by fully competent experts overseas; promoting greater
coordination would allow agencies to husband resources by leveraging expertise
residing in the private sector, relying upon the work of trusted foreign
counterparts, and dividing responsibility with such overseas experts when
95
undertaking an analysis in the first instance.
Absent an empirical analysis of the pecuniary costs and savings that
enhanced international regulatory cooperation efforts may bring to agencies, it
is impossible to determine whether the former would exceed the latter. If the
expenses prove overly ponderous, as explored earlier, the agency might
consider implementing a “superfund” program whereby fees collected in
connection with challenges by well-funded parties serve to cover the agency’s
costs and subsidize challenges by less affluent entities.
92. See Administrative Conference of the United State, Recommendation 2011-6, International
Regulatory Cooperation, ¶ 8, 77 Fed. Reg. 2257, 2261 (Jan. 17, 2012) (“Agencies should promote to
foreign authorities the principles that undergird the United States administrative and regulatory
process . . . .”).
93. Schlosser & Bull, supra note 25.
94. Bull, supra note 75, at 653.
95. See Administrative Conference of the United States, Recommendation 2011-6, International
Regulatory Cooperation, ¶ 4, 77 Fed. Reg. 2257, 2260 (Jan. 17, 2012).
To deploy limited resources more effectively, agencies should, where appropriate and
practicable, identify foreign authorities that maintain high quality and effective standards and
practices and identify areas in which the tests, inspections, or certifications by agencies and
such foreign agencies overlap.
Id.
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IV
CONCLUSION
In an era characterized by rapid technological change creating increasingly
seamless cross-border connections and the concomitant globalization of every
aspect of business in the private sector, the insular regulatory regimes that
prevail in most modern states have become anachronistic. At the same time,
efforts at global governance have largely failed, partly as a result of residual
commitments to national sovereignty and partly as a consequence of the
challenges of erecting a supernational governing entity. The challenges stem
from the difficulty in coordinating various international actors while still
preserving the ability of nation-states and smaller jurisdictions to respond to
local concerns. Further, it is hardly beyond cavil that such a system of global
governance is normatively desirable: as F.A. Hayek and other Austrian School
economists have contended, centralized, bureaucratic solutions are generally
suboptimal insofar as they stifle the remarkable efficiencies that arise from a
decentralized process that aggregates the various pieces of relevant information
otherwise dispersed throughout the broader society.
This article constructs a decentralized approach to international regulatory
cooperation by exploring mechanisms for capturing the knowledge of
nongovernmental experts and even everyday citizens in conducting robust risk
assessments and accurately gauging the public risk tolerance. The existence of a
major disparity between the regulatory approach adopted by the United States
and that of one or more of its key trading partners should alert regulators to a
potentially unnecessary divergence, and the mechanisms explored in this article
should help ensure that any disparities that persist are fully justified on the basis
of sound science and overall societal risk tolerance. Achieving complete
convergence is neither feasible nor desirable—the sovereign people in a
modern democracy will often choose a somewhat different balance between
market freedom and regulatory protection than that prevailing in sister states.
Yet the countless benefits of regulatory convergence across borders provide a
powerful incentive for modern states to develop mechanisms that ensure any
residual disparities are fully justified.

